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Ghada M. Ismail
Robert C. Vackar College of Business and Entrepreneurship,
University of Texas Rio Grande Valley

Brand Equity, Earnings Management, and Financial Reporting Irregularities

Owning valuable brands enhances the financial well-being of firms not only through increased revenues
and profitability but also by mitigating agency problems, earnings management, and financial reporting
irregularities. Firms with high brand equity are less likely to have income-inflating discretionary accruals,
announce earnings restatements, or experience SEC investigations. Brand equity reduces the likelihood of
manipulation through incentive and opportunity channels, which we capture in CEO characteristics and
compensation, and corporate governance measures. Brand equity reduces the likelihood of financial
reporting irregularities more for durable goods firms and firms with shorter-tenured CEOs, as the latter
are most vulnerable to performance pressures. (JEL G31, G34, M31, M37, M41, M42)
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Abstract

Brand Equity, Earnings Management, and Financial Reporting Irregularities

The prior literature suggests two reasons that corporate managers engage in earnings management.
First, incentives, such as stock-based compensation, are offered to managers to reward their skill
and performance. Healy (1985) and Guidry, Leone, and Rock (1999) show that managers exercise
accounting discretion to maximize the present value of their bonus compensation. Under
significant market pressure, executives are also likely to manage earnings to meet or beat analysts’
estimates (Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser 1999; Almeida 2019).1 Second, managers engage in
opportunistic earnings management in the presence of weak governance mechanisms, especially
when managers have more power and discretion over the board (Hossain et al. 2011). Regardless
of the reasons, in the long-run aggressive earnings management sometimes entails sacrificing
economic value (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005) and can damage the firms' image,
reputation, and trust (Raman and Shahrur 2008). Such outcomes adversely affect firms'
shareholders and other providers of capital (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1996; Hribar and
Jenkins 2004; Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz 2004), auditors (Huang and Scholz 2012), and
top executives (Hazarika, Karpoff, and Nahata 2012).2 Given these adverse effects, we expect that
firms invest in specific activities that build trust and limit earnings management practices.
We argue and present evidence that firms with high brand equity use more cautious accounting
methods and strive to avoid earnings management and financial reporting irregularities. Brand
equity encompasses customer perceptions of a brand along several dimensions, such as brand

Almeida (2019) discusses evidence on earnings management and the practice of chasing certain earnings
targets.
2 Additionally, researchers have paid considerable attention to studying actions companies undertake to fix
reputational losses following financial reporting irregularities. See, for example, Farber (2005), Cheng and
Farber (2008), and Wilson (2008).
1

3

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/rcfs/advance-article/doi/10.1093/rcfs/cfaa018/5903745 by The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley user on 14 September 2020

Firms manage earnings in various ways to achieve their desired financial reporting outcomes.

loyalty and trust, perceived quality and leadership, and brand personality and organizational

propositions derived by customers but also the organizational characteristics (people, values, and
programs) underlying the brand. High-brand-equity firms, such as Apple, Google, Coca Cola,
Procter & Gamble, and Disney, enjoy various inherent characteristics that can reduce incentives
and possibly opportunities for earnings management and financial reporting irregularities.
First, earnings management and financial reporting irregularities cost high-brand firms more.
Raman and Shahrur (2008) show that earnings management leads to a loss of trust by a firm's
stakeholders, which adversely affects customer-supplier relationships. Further, accounting
irregularities can lead to changes in trade terms with customers (Karpoff, Lee, and Martin 2008)
and cost of reputation-rebuilding actions (Chakravarthy, deHaan, and Rajgopal 2014). Since highbrand-equity firms depend on their relations with customers more (Raman and Shahrur 2008), they
are expected to suffer higher costs if manipulation is uncovered, due to more significant changes
in trade terms and reputation-building actions. For example, according to Brand Finance (2020), a
brand valuation consultancy company, Wells Fargo was an extremely valuable bank brand in 2015.
However, in September 2016, the bank announced that it fired 5,300 employees over several years
for creating millions of fake accounts (Egan 2016). The bank also replaced longtime CEO John
Stumpf, discarded its wildly unrealistic sales goals that led to the bad behavior, and apologized for
mistreating workers. According to CNN, surveys showed that 30% of Wells Fargo's customers
considered dumping the scandal-ridden bank, putting $93 billion of (or 7% of its total) deposits at
risk. Customers' top complaint was that Wells Fargo engaged in “dishonest, unethical, or illegal
practices” (Egan 2018).3
High equity-based compensation may have factored in the scandal. The bank’s former CEO earned $83
million by exercising vested stock options, although an additional $41 million in unvested stock awards
3
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associations (Aaker 1996). Thus, a firm's brand equity depends on not only unique value

Second, because of the intensive media coverage directed to high-brand-equity firms,

Tavassoli, Sorescu, and Chandy (2014) show that executives achieve nonpecuniary utility by
working for firms with valuable brands as a trade-off for accepting lower compensation. Thus, to
maximize their utility, managers avoid behaviors, such as earnings management, that may induce
a loss in brand value. In summary, high brand equity can reduce incentives for earnings
management, both at the firm level and at the executive level.
Further, because brand building entails highly specialized investments, the value of these
investments depends on the prospects of the business relationship (Raman and Shahrur 2008).
Consequently, high-brand-equity firms may enhance governance mechanisms and adopt an
organization culture that limits managerial opportunism that is associated with earnings
management and encourages managers to focus on long-term, brand-building efforts. Therefore,
we hypothesize that brand equity can affect firm value by reducing aggressive accounting and the
likelihood of the value- and reputation-destroying earning restatements. This new channel is in
addition to enhancing performance and returns and helping hire executives at lower pay as
documented in previous studies (Tavassoli, Sorescu, and Chandy 2014; Aaker and Jacobson 1994;
Lane and Jacobson 1995; Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998, 1999; Krasnikov, Mishra, and
Orozco 2009). We call this the precaution hypothesis. Alternatively, if high brand equity is
indicative of excessive market power or monopolistic possession of technology, substituting a
firm's products might be extremely difficult or costly for customers. As a result, high brand equity
can protect against the consequences of accounting scandals. We call this the market power

were forfeited (Cowley 2017). The CEO’s total direct compensation in 2015 was just over $19 million
(Avalos 2017).
5
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accounting scandals can lead to a more substantial reputational loss for the responsible executives.

hypothesis.4

approach following Vitorino (2014) and Belo, Lin, and Vitorino (2014) to capture long-term brand
equity instead of tactical advertising expenditures. Our baseline empirical results uncover a
negative association between brand equity and the likelihood of both earnings misstatements and
earnings management. Our baseline method employs discretionary accruals, which are measured
by the modified Jones’ (1991) method following Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995). Our results
also show that, when high-brand-equity firms report earnings restatements, they are less likely to
have a misstatement that eventually involves a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
investigation.
Because financial reporting irregularities may exert ex-post influence on customer relationships
(Karpoff, Lee, and Martin 2008), reverse causality between brand equity and financial reporting
irregularities could be a concern in our baseline results. Further, our baseline results may also
suffer from omitted variable bias because decisions regarding investment in brand equity and
selection of accounting methods are both internally made. We conduct several robustness tests to
reduce the likelihood that our findings are driven simply by endogeneity. First, we use instrumental
variable (IV) regressions following Jha and Cox (2015) and Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog (2016)
to address both omitted variable bias and simultaneous causality issues. Specifically, we use firm
age as an instrument for brand equity. Simon and Sullivan (1993) suggest that firm age is one firm
characteristic that influences a firm's brand equity. To the best of our knowledge, firm age is not a
direct determinant of a firm's propensity to manage earnings or to engage in acts that lead to
earnings restatements. Firms engage in accounting manipulation regardless of their age unless they

4

We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this alternative hypothesis.
6
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Our empirical results support the precaution hypothesis. We use the perpetual inventory

design proper mechanisms that prevent such behavior. We argue that as firms age, to preserve their

restrains manipulative behavior. We also conduct relevance and exogeneity tests to assure the
validity of firm age as an instrument. Results of our IV regression using both two-stage least squares
(2SLS) and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) mirror our baseline ordinary least squares
(OLS) results: firms with high brand equity are less likely to misstate earnings or manage earnings
using discretionary accruals. 5
Second, we use several alternative measures of brand equity including the financial-based
measure of brand equity proposed by Simon and Sullivan (1993) to address the disagreement in
the prior literature about the best way to measure brand equity (Johansson, Dimofte, and
Mazvancheryl 2012) and to eliminate a possible measurement error in estimating our main proxy
of brand equity. We also use several alternative measures of financial reporting irregularities, such
as severe restatements that result in SEC investigations. Further, we test the robustness of our
baseline results using a performance and growth adjusted measure of discretionary accruals to
account for firm performance and growth (Collins, Pungaliya, and Vijh 2017). Also, because our
measure of brand equity constructed using advertising expenses may be related to the estimate of
discretionary accruals, we confirm the robustness of our baseline results using an alternative
measure of discretionary accruals adjusted for advertising expenses.
We test two different channels that can explain the negative effect of brand equity on earnings
restatements and earnings management. To test the incentive channel at the firm level, we
differentiate between nondurable and durable goods firms. Macneil (1980) suggests that typical

In addition to using firm age as an instrument, we also use the average brand equity of a firm’s industry
(excluding the firm for which the IV is being calculated) as an alternative instrument. Results of that test
are similar to our reported results and are available on request.
5
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brand value, firms are more likely to build an organizational structure and corporate culture that

relational contracts include ongoing implicit claims between a firm and its. Extending his study,

purchasing implicit claims related to the specified quality of performance and availability of
service over the life of the product. Because the useful life of the product is relatively long, implicit
claims with customers related to durable products are likely to be significant. Thus, the importance
of brand equity increases in industries of durable products due to the significance of customers'
implicit claims in these industries. Consequently, we expect accounting scandals to most
disastrously affect the customer relationships of firms making durable goods. Our results show
that the mitigating effect of brand equity on financial reporting irregularities is more substantial
for firms in durable product industries.
To test for the incentive channel at the executive level, we differentiate between firms with
CEOs who have high versus low career concerns. Because of the excessive media coverage
received by high-brand firms, accounting scandals are expected to have a larger reputational loss
for executives involved in such scandals. Consistent with this conjecture, our results show that the
mitigating effect of high brand equity on financial reporting irregularities is stronger for firms
whose CEOs have higher career concerns.
We test the opportunity channel as a second channel of the mitigating effects of brand equity
on earnings management practices. Specifically, we differentiate between firms with high versus
low board independence. Independent boards serve as a check on managerial opportunism and
limit the opportunity to manage earnings easily. Indeed, our results show that the mitigating effect
of high brand equity on earnings management is more substantial for firms with higher board
independence, a finding that lends support to the idea that both incentives and a lack of
opportunities are channels through which brand equity affects a firm’s propensity manage

8
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Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores (1995) argue that customers purchasing durable products are also

earnings.6

likelihood of engagement in earnings management and financial reporting irregularities, we
investigate whether high-brand-equity firms have preexisting cautious accounting policies
unrelated to their direct investment in brand equity. Specifically, we examine the dynamic effects
of BE on various measures of earnings restatements using the dynamic regression method following
Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2014) and Klasa et al. (2018). We find that preexisting cautious
accounting practices in high-brand-equity firms do not drive our results. Further, our results are
robust to the exclusion of the great recession years and do not disappear after the Sarbanes Oxley
Act (SOX).7
Our contributions to the literature are twofold.8 First, we contribute to the finance and
accounting literature by showing that brand equity affects the choice of accounting methods and the
likelihood of engaging in earnings management and financial reporting irregularities. Two studies
closely related to ours focus on the determinants and consequences of earnings management in the
context of a firm's relationship with suppliers and customers. Raman and Shahrur (2008) find that
earnings management adversely affects the duration of customer-supplier relationships and may
influence the perception of suppliers/customers about the firm's prospects. Chakravarthy et al.

Hossain et al. (2011) show that, in the presence of weak governance mechanisms, managerial opportunism
is associated with greater levels of earnings management. A firm’s brand-building efforts may encompass
improving governance mechanisms that improve executive behavior and lead to lower earnings
management. To test this channel, we conduct additional tests that control for governance measures, such
as board independence and institutional ownership; compensation measures, such as pay-performance
sensitivity (Delta) and the risk-taking incentives (Vega); and CEO characteristics, such as CEO age, tenure,
gender, and ownership. The results of these tests are untabulated and are available on request.
7 These additional robustness checks are untabulated and are available on request.
8 Previous studies focus on various firm characteristics, such as sales growth, profitability, operating cycle,
leverage, and fixed assets (Dechow and Dichev 2002; Francis et al. 2005; Dechow, Ge, and Schrand 2010),
but ignore brand equity.
6
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To explore additional evidence regarding the association between ex ante brand equity and the

(2014) show that following a serious accounting restatement, firms implement a reputation repair

these studies, we show that by investing in brand equity, firms act pro-actively and reduce
incentives and opportunities for earnings management.
Second, we contribute to the marketing literature by identifying another channel through which
brand equity affects firm value. The previous marketing literature focuses on the relation between
brand equity and size and frequency of customers' purchases, revenues, profitability, stock returns,
cash flow volatility, and uncertainty about the firm's idiosyncratic risk.9 We show that high brand
equity can affect firm value not only by enhancing performance and returns and helping hire
executives at lower pay but also by reducing engagement in aggressive accounting and the
likelihood of the value- and reputation-destroying earnings restatements.
1.

Review of the Literature

1.1. The impact of brand equity on earnings management and financial reporting
irregularities
Financial reporting irregularities negatively affect many different groups of stakeholders,
including customers, employees, and local communities. For example, Karpoff, Lee, and Martin
(2008) show that reputational losses from financial reporting irregularity are estimated to be 27%
of a firm's prerestatement market value, comprise two-thirds of a firm's total restatement-related
value loss, and are 7.5 times the sum of penalties imposed through the legal and regulatory system.
The authors claim that the reputational losses include possible loss of trust by customers that leads
to changes in trade with a firm. Similarly, Raman and Shahrur (2008) argue that earnings

9 See, for example, Aaker and Jacobson (1994), Lane

and Jacobson (1995), Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey,
(1998, 1999), Krasnikov, Mishra, and Orozco (2009), Rego, Billett and Morgan (2009), and Stahl,
Heitmann, and Lehmann (2012).
10
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strategy targeted to each stakeholder, and these actions generate positive market returns. Extending

management can lead to termination of customers' relationships, and the loss in customers' trust is

value of a firm's investments in building customer-supplier relationships depends on its prospects,
the firm will focus on preserving such trust-based relationships. According to Chakravarthy,
deHaan, and Rajgopal (2014), following announcements of financial reporting irregularities, firms
undertake significant reputation-repair actions directed toward customers, employees, and
communities such that these activities are positively correlated with the degree to which a firm
derives value from its stakeholder-specific relation.
Based on the above discussions, firms with more reliance on high-value customer relationships
that are mostly built on a trusted brand and a strong corporate culture will be negatively affected
to a greater extent when a firm is involved in earnings manipulation. These firms will design proper
incentives and governance systems to limit the opportunistic behavior of managers and focus on
increasing the value of brand equity. In addition to the role that high brand equity may play at the
firm level, it can also disincentivize manipulation by executives and managers. High-brand-equity
firms are usually subject to higher media coverage. Consequently, accounting scandals in such
firms are expected to have a more destructive impact on executives' reputation than in low brand
equity counterparts. Therefore, we predict that firms with higher investment in customer
relationships use less aggressive accounting methods and strive to avoid financial reporting
irregularities. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first empirical work on the impact of

Implicit claims can be defined as the implied commitments toward stakeholders that have no legal
standing. Specifically, Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores (1995, p. 256) state that “although firms often enter
into explicit contracts with their stakeholders, many ongoing relations remain implicit (e.g., implied
promises of continuing availability of parts and service to customers who purchase durable goods). Since
implied commitments generally have no legal standing, they have been viewed as self-enforcing.”
10
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positively associated with a firm's reliance on implicit contracts with customers. 10 Because the

investment in brand equity on a firms' choice of accounting methods and the likelihood of

The prior literature differentiates between the effect of severe and minor misstatements or
earnings management. Teoh, Welch, and Wang (1998a) show that issuers report the worst
performance following seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) with unusually large income-increasing
accounting adjustments before the offering.11 Further, Owers, Lin, and Rogers (2002) show that
restatements accompanied by an SEC investigation have abnormal returns that are significantly
more negative than those of other firms, indicating that the restatements accompanied by the SEC
investigations are terrible news. Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008), who classify restatements
associated with an SEC investigation as irregularities instead of minor errors, make similar
arguments. These authors claim that SEC-investigation-accompanied restatements are more likely
to involve managerial misbehavior. SEC investigations are also distinct from discretionary
accruals-based measures of earnings management because the investigations are not a function of
the magnitude of a firm's advertisement expenses. Because of their higher value-destroying impact
and their stronger signal of managerial misbehavior, SEC-investigation-accompanied restatements
are expected to result in a much greater negative impact on supplier-customer relationships and to
impose higher opportunity costs on companies. Consequently, we expect firms with high brand
equity to avoid severe financial reporting manipulation that has the potential to invite SEC
investigations.

Similarly, Teoh, Welch, and Wang (1998b) document similar patterns for initial public offerings (IPOs).
Allen, Larson, and Sloan (2013) show that extreme accruals exhibit a high frequency of subsequent
reversals that predict future accruals, earnings, and stock returns.
11
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engagement in financial reporting irregularities.

1.2.

The impact of brand equity on firm value

value of S&P 500 companies, studies have found mixed results about how much brands are worth
and the source of brand value. Prior literature shows that brands generate value by affecting
customers' thoughts and actions (Sorescu and Sorescu 2016). These thoughts can lead to the market
power that allows higher prices (Ailawadi, Lehmann, and Neslin 2003), or sales (Mizik and
Jacobson 2009). Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey (1998, 1999) show that brand equity can create
value by causing customers to buy more, buy sooner, and buy consistently. Ertekin, Sorescu, and
Houston (2018) show that the long-run performance of firms that successfully defend their brands
in court is positive.
The relation between brand equity and economic performance has also received attention.
Madden, Fehle, and Fournier (2006) demonstrate that brand development strategies create
shareholder value.12 Other research identifies several channels through which brand equity can
affect firm value. Specifically, brand equity has been shown to increase the size and frequency of
customers' purchases, revenues, profitability, and stock returns, and to reduce cash flow volatility
and uncertainty about firm's idiosyncratic risk (Aaker and Jacobson 1994; Lane and Jacobson 1995;
Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998, 1999; Krasnikov, Mishra, and Orozco 2009; Rego, Billett,
and Morgan 2009; Stahl, Heitmann, and Lehmann 2012). Similarly, Robinson, Tuli, and Kohli
(2015) show that positive abnormal returns follow brand licensing. Further, Hariharan, Bezawada,

Similarly, Himme and Fischer (2014) investigate the joint and interactive role of customer satisfaction,
brand value, and corporate reputation for stock market beta and credit ratings, which reflect variation in
equity and debt risk premiums across firms. Fischer and Himme (2017) develop a model showing how
advertising and other brand investments increase customer-based brand equity, which, in turn, affects firms’
financial leverage and credit spread and ultimately elevates the firms’ level of financial resources. Hsu,
Fournier, and Srinivasan (2016) study the effect of brand strategy on stock returns and idiosyncratic risk.
Johansson, Dimofte, and Mazvancheryl (2012) show that high brand equity helped stabilize financial
returns and reduce share price volatility during the 2008 financial crisis.
12

13

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/rcfs/advance-article/doi/10.1093/rcfs/cfaa018/5903745 by The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley user on 14 September 2020

Although popular estimates indicate that brands account for a significant percentage of the

and Talukdar (2015) argue that brand extensions could affect revenue and firm value not only

of the brand extensions.13
Tavassoli, Sorescu, and Chandy (2014) conjecture that by focusing on customer-based brand
equity, the previous literature understates brands' actual contribution to firm value. Specifically,
they develop and test the concept of employee-based brand equity, which they define as "the value
that a brand provides to a firm through its effects on the attitudes and behaviors of its employees."
These authors show that executives derive nonpecuniary utility by working for firms with valuable
brands, and, consequently, accept less compensation because of the benefits they receive from
working for these branded firms (Tavassoli, Sorescu, and Chandy 2014, p. 676–77). The arguments
of Tavassoli, Sorescu, and Chandy (2014) could provide an additional explanation for our
conjectures and results. If a manager's utility is maximized by being affiliated with a valuable
brand, s/he will avoid risky behaviors, such as financial reporting irregularities, that might harm
brand value (Karpoff, Lee, and Martin 2008). Financial reporting irregularities are costly to highbrand firms and their executives. Tavassoli, Sorescu, and Chandy (2014) highlight the effect of
brand equity at the time of hiring, that is, sacrificing part of one's pay in exchange for a valuable
affiliation with a high-brand firm. However, less is known about the possible impact of brand equity
on managers' behavior and decision-making beyond that point, especially for financial reporting
irregularities, which are the focus of our paper.

Brand equity also reduces firms’ cash flow volatility (Krasnikov, Mishra, and Orozco 2009), provides
additional net debt capacity, measured by higher leverage and lower cash holdings (Larkin 2013), increases
profitability (Stahl, Heitmann, and Lehmann 2012), increases investors’ attention (Lou 2014), and predicts
firm-specific unsystematic risk (Rego, Billett, and Morgan 2009).
13
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through the spillover effect and the extension effect but also through the aggregate market impact

2.

Data and Methods

REITs, small business institutes (SBIs), exchange-traded funds, closed-end funds, regulated firms
with a Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code between 4900 and 4999, and financial firms
with SIC between 6000 and 6999. Following Belo, Lin, and Vitorino (2014), we exclude all firmyear observations with missing advertising expenses. Our primary source of data on earnings
restatements is Audit Analytics. We complement restatement data using the Governmental
Accountability Office (GAO) files. We follow prior literature in removing restatements associated
with clerical errors (Hennes, Leone, and Miller 2008). After estimating our main proxy for earnings
management, discretionary accruals, and merging all databases, our sample comprises 47,216
firm-year observations covering the period 1990–2018. We obtain data on CEO characteristics
and ownership from Compustat ExecuComp database.
We follow the methodology of Belo, Lin, and Vitorino (2014) and Vitorino (2014) to define
brand equity, BE, our main explanatory variable. The advantage of this measure of brand equity is
that it uses advertising expenses, which capture a firm's investment in customer-specific
relationships. Further, it provides a firm level instead of a brand-level measure of brand equity.
Specifically, we use advertising expenditures, which creates persistent brand value (Wang, Zhang,
and Ouyang 2009; Fischer and Himme 2017), to calculate BE using the perpetual inventory method
as follows:
BEt = (1 - δ)BEt-1 + At,

(1)

where Bet is a firm’s brand equity and At is a firm’s investment in its brands as measured by
advertising expense. 14 Δ denotes the depreciation rate required to implement the perpetual

For more details on the construction of this measure of brand equity, see Belo, Lin, and Vitorino
(2014).
14
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We acquire financial data for all Compustat firms for the period 1990–2018. We exclude ADRs,

inventory method, reflecting the decay in brand equity over time. Following Belo, Lin, and

a firm’s total assets.
We use discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management. Our measure of total
accruals is similar to Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b) in using balance sheet and income
statement variables. We calculate total accruals (TACR) as follows:
TACR = ΔCA – ΔCL – ΔCASH – ΔSTD – DEP,

(2)

where all independent variables are defined in the appendix. We estimate discretionary accruals,
Disc_accruals, as the residual 𝜀𝑖, from the Jones’ (1991) model modified following Dechow, Sloan,
and Sweeney (1995). Specifically, for each calendar year and two-digit SIC code, we estimate the
following regression equation:
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1 1⁄𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 (∆ 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,

(3)

where TACR denotes total accruals calculated from Equation (2) and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 denotes a random error
term. We control for the lagged value of TACR. Further, following the accounting literature, all
variables are scaled by TAt-1. Nondiscretionary accruals are measured as the fitted value of Equation
(3). Lastly, Disc_Accruals is measured as the model's residual, 𝜀𝑖.
Collins, Pungaliya, and Vijh (2017) argue that discretionary accruals estimated by the Jones’
(1991) model using quarterly data are misspecified because it fails to control for accruals associated
with performance and growth. To address this concern, we estimate another measure of
discretionary accruals that accounts for performance and growth, DA_PG. Specifically, for each
firm-year, we first estimate discretionary accruals as the residual from the modified Jones’ (1991)

All our results use a 50% depreciation rate (a more sustainable brand equity). The baseline model using
20% as a depreciation rate is presented in the robustness section. Further, all results using that depreciation
rate are available on request.
15
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Vitorino (2014), we use a depreciation rate of 𝛿= 50%.15 We scale our measure of brand equity by

model. Then, within each year and industry (two-digit SIC code), we construct five quintile ranks

portfolios within each industry-year. DA_PG is the firm-year discretionary accruals,
Disc_accruals minus the median discretionary accruals of the performance and growth-matched
portfolio for the same year and industry.
Further, to address the concern that our measure of discretionary accruals is mechanically
affected by the accounting treatment of advertising expenses (which is used to estimate our proxy
for brand equity), we estimate a third measure of discretionary accruals, DA_Adv. This measure of
discretionary accruals accounts for accruals that are caused by a firm's advertising expenses in
each year. Recall that discretionary accruals are the residuals from a model where all the variables
are scaled by total assets and that BE is also a percentage of assets.
Table 1, panel A, presents descriptive statistics for our main dependent and explanatory
variables. Around 11.5% of our firm-year observations are classified as earnings misstatement
years. Further, the average company in our sample has a Disc_accruals of 0.013 and BE of 0.081.
Table 1, panel B, presents descriptive statistics for alternative measures of earnings management
and financial reporting irregularities. These descriptive statistics show that around 56% of our
sample firms announced an earnings restatement at least once during the sample period (Restater),
and that out of the sample of firms that experience earnings restatements, around 10% of the cases
experienced Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation (SEC_Inv). When
adjusting our discretionary accruals measure to performance and growth (using DA_PG), the
average firm in our sample has a mean discretionary accrual of 0.003. Further, the average
discretionary accruals adjusted to advertising expenses, DA_adv, is 0.005. To ensure the robustness of
our tests, we use all of these alternative measures of irregularities.
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based on growth (sales growth) and operating performance (ROA), resulting in 25 unique

Table 2 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients. Consistent with our main conjecture, we

(Misstatement) and the degree of earnings management (Disc_accruals). High-brand-equity firms
adopt more cautious accounting policies by having lower income-inflating discretionary accruals
and are less likely to engage in actions that could lead to misstating earnings reports. MB and both
ROA and Disc_accruals are positively correlated. These correlations are consistent with the
conjecture of Collins, Pungaliya, and Vijh (2017) that estimates of discretionary accruals based on
Jones (1991) are correlated with a firm's profitability and growth. Further, our untabulated results
show a negative correlation between BE and our alternative measures of earnings restatements
(Restater and SEC_Inv) and alternative measures of earnings management (DA_PG and DA_adv).
3.

Analysis and Results

3.1.

Brand equity and financial reporting quality

Our central premise is that firms with high investment in customer relationships strive to avoid
financial reporting irregularities. Table 3 presents univariate tests of this conjecture by comparing
the likelihood of misstating earnings and the level of discretionary accruals between high and lowBE firms.
Table 3, panel A, reports the mean Misstatement and Disc_accruals for firms with BE above and
below its median. Firms with high BE are less likely to misstate their earnings. The mean
Misstatement of firms with high BE is 10.7%, which is significantly lower than the 12.2% reported
for firms with low BE. Further, firms with high BE have a mean Disc_accruals of -0.001, which
is significantly lower than the 0.027 reported for firms with low BE. This stark difference in the
use of discretionary accruals indicates that while the average firm with high BE employs more
cautious accounting methods (income-decreasing accruals), the average low-BE firm employs
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observe a negative association between BE and the likelihood of misstating financial reports

more aggressive accounting methods (income-increasing accruals). Table 3, panels B and C, report

respectively. Statistics in panel B shows that while the likelihood of misstating earnings is 11%
for high BE firms, it is significantly higher (about 14%) for low BE firms.
Further, these results (Table 3) show that companies on the top quartile of BE have incomedecreasing discretionary accruals of -0.009. In contrast, firms in the bottom quartile of BE have
average income-increasing discretionary accruals of 0.037. Similarly, statistics in panel C show
that while the likelihood of misstating earnings is 10.5% for the top decile BE firms, it is
significantly higher (about 14.4%) for firms in the lowest BE decile. These results also show that
companies in the top BE decile have income-decreasing discretionary accruals of -0.022, while
firms in the bottom BE decile have average income-increasing discretionary accruals of 0.042.
Across all panels in Table 3, the differences between Misstatement and Disc_accruals of high and
low BE firms are both economically significant and statistically significant at the 1% level.16 Since
Disc_accruals is estimated as a percentage of a firm’s total assets, the 0.066 difference in means
between top and bottom BE deciles is equivalent to a $206.6 million average difference in
discretionary accruals.17 These statistics provide preliminary support to our main conjecture that
high investment in brand equity is associated with more cautious accounting methods and to a
lower propensity to engage in earnings misstatements.
To formally test the association between brand equity and our proxies of earnings management,
we control for the other determinants of earnings restatements and earnings management in the
following regression model:

Similar results are reported when using the Wilcoxon rank-sum difference in median Disc_Accruals
tests.
17 The average total assets in our sample size is $3.13 billion.
16
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Misstatement and Disc_accruals for firms based on quartile and decile ranking on BE,

Earnings management = ∝ + 𝛽𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,

(4)

separate regressions. We control for return on assets (ROA) and multiyear negative operating
performance (Neg_ROA) following the literature that finds a relation between performance and
manipulation (Beasley 1996). We control for the proportion of assets in receivables and inventory
(AR_IN) because fraud is more likely when this proportion is high (Summers and Sweeney 1998).
We also control for growth measured by the market-to-book ratio (MB). We include year dummy
variables to control for between-year variations. We also include industry (two-digit SIC code)
dummy variables following Kedia, Koh, and Rajgopal (2015), who document an industry spillover
effect of financial reporting irregularities.
Table 4 presents the results of this baseline test. The dependent variable in Models 1–3 is
Misstatement, and in Models 4–6 is Disc_accruals. The coefficients for BE across all models are
negative and statistically significant. When controlling for year and industry fixed effects, we find
that the coefficient for BE in Model 3 is -0.311, indicating that increasing investment in BE leads
to a reduced likelihood of engaging in activities that lead to financial reporting misstatements.
Similarly, the coefficient for BE in Model 6 is -0.140 and statistically significant at the 5% level.
High brand equity is associated with more cautious use of income-increasing discretionary
accruals. Further, there is a significant positive association between discretionary accruals and
AR_IN (Summers and Sweeney 1998). Our results also show that highly levered firms use less
income-increasing discretionary accruals.18

In addition to these tabulated results, to account for the possible impact of ROA and MB on discretionary
accruals (Collins, Pungaliya, and Vijh 2017), we run our baseline model for subgroups of firms based on
ROA and MB. The results of those tests are similar to our baseline models and are available on request.
18
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where Earning management is measured by Misstatement and Disc_accruals, respectively, in

3.2.

Brand equity and earnings management: Addressing endogeneity

both misstating financial reports (Misstatement) and earnings management measured by
discretionary accruals. We argue that such a negative association is due to a causal relation in which
investments in customer relationships ex ante reduces a firm's tendency to use aggressive
accounting methods and to engage in actions that could trigger earnings restatement. However,
endogeneity may be a concern in our baseline model for several reasons. First, since the levels of
both advertising and accounting methods are determined internally, both BE and Disc_Accruals
are determined by a factor(s) not controlled for in our model. Second, Chakravarthy, deHaan, and
Rajgopal (2014) argue that customer demand (and hence brand equity) is likely to decline following
announcements of accounting fraud. As a result, simultaneous causality might be another concern
in our baseline results using Misstatement. Further, previous studies have disagreed about the best
way to measure brand equity (Johansson, Dimofte, and Mazvancheryl 2012), our results might
suffer an error-in-measurement issue related to our brand equity measure. In this section, we
address each of these issues.
We start by addressing the simultaneous causality and the omitted variable bias issues.
Specifically, we use firm age as an instrument for our measure of brand equity. Simon and Sullivan
(1993) suggest that firm age is one of the firm characteristics that influence a firm's brand equity.
We believe a firm age does not have a direct effect on earnings management. Firms manipulate
their earnings due to poor corporate culture and misaligned incentives, not because of their age.
In contrast, as firms age, their brand visibility improves with time, and to preserve their brand
value, firms are more likely to build an organizational structure and corporate culture that restrains
manipulative behavior. Further, to the best of our knowledge, the prior literature does not provide
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Our baseline results show a negative association between brand equity and the likelihood of

evidence that older companies are more (or less) likely to engage in financial reporting

instrument. Specifically, in an untabulated test of exogeneity, we confirm that the coefficient
estimates of firm age in a model that uses the residual from our baseline regression as a dependent
variable is statistically insignificant. We use F-statistics to assess the strength of our IV. Our firststage regression F-statistic is significantly higher than the typical threshold of 10, as well as any
of the critical values in the Wald test. Further, all R2’s in the first-stage regression models of the
two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions are high, confirming the strength of our instrument. 20
Table 5 reports the results of our IV models. The IV regression results lend support to our
findings in the baseline OLS regressions. The coefficient for our IV, ln_firm_age, is significant
and positive at the 1% level in our first-stage regression (column 1). Consistent with our baseline
models, the coefficients for our instrumented BE in Models 2 and 3 are both statistically significant
at the 5% level. This test diminishes the possibility that this negative association is caused by a
two-way relationship between BE on one hand and Misstatement and Disc_Accruals, on the other
hand, or an omitted variable in our baseline models.

In addition to using firm age as an IV, we use an alternative IV that is the average BE of a firm’s industry
(excluding the one firm for which the IV is being calculated) following Jha and Cox (2015) and Ferrell,
Liang and Renneboog (2016). Our results using that alternative IV are similar to those using firm age and
are available on request.
20 To address possible heteroscedasticity, we conduct our tests using the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) in addition to the two-stage least squares (2SLS). That the results of the GMM are almost identical
to those using 2SLS refutes the possibility that our 2SLS results are affected by heteroscedasticity.
19
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irregularities.19 Further, we conduct tests of relevance and exogeneity to assure the validity of our

3.3.

Incentive channel and opportunity channel

are functions of both managerial incentives and the opportunity to participate in earnings
management. In this section, we further investigate the channels through which BE affects earnings
management. Specifically, we test whether the negative association between BE and Misstatement
and Disc_Accruals is stronger for firms and managers with less incentive and lower opportunity
to engage in earnings management.
We first capture the incentive to engage in financial reporting irregularities at the firm level.
Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores (1995) argue that the importance of brand equity increases in
industries of durable products due to the significance of customers' implicit claims in these
industries. Consequently, accounting scandals are expected to most disastrously affect the firmcustomer relationships for firms in durable goods industries. In other words, if BE creates a high
disincentive for earnings management, this effect should be stronger for firms in durable product
industries. We identify firms in durable products industries following John (1993) and Titman and
Wessels (1988). Specifically, firms involved in the construction or manufacturing of durable
products are those with SIC codes 150–179, 245, 250–259, 283, 301, and 324–399. Next, we
capture incentives to engage in financial reporting irregularities at the executive level. Because of
the intensive media coverage directed to high-BE firms, executives of these firms are expected to
have a larger reputational loss when they engage in irregularities. However, this disincentive is
stronger for executives with greater career concerns, which we measure by whether the CEO has
been in this position fewer years than the median for all CEOs. Ali and Zhang (2015) examine the
changes in CEOs' incentive to manage their firms' reported earnings during their tenure and show that
earnings overstatement is greater in the early years than in the later years of a CEOs' service. They
attribute these results to the notion that new CEOs try to favorably influence the market's perception
23

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/rcfs/advance-article/doi/10.1093/rcfs/cfaa018/5903745 by The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley user on 14 September 2020

As we mention above, accounting choices and the tendency to engage in earnings restatements

of their ability in their early years of service when the market is more uncertain. Consequently, we

management.
Next, we investigate the possible effect of corporate governance on our results. Because of the
higher cost of earnings management, firms may precautionarily enhance corporate governance to
reduce the managerial opportunity to engage in aggressive earnings management and actions that
can trigger earnings restatements. To capture corporate governance, we used the percentage of
independent members on a firm's board of directors. Our objective is to test whether the impact of
BE on earnings restatements and earnings management is mediated by erosion in the managerial
opportunity of engagement in such acts, through enhanced corporate governance.
Table 6 reports the results of testing each channel, namely, incentives and opportunities. Panel
A (B) in Table 6 reports results for models that use Misstatement (Disc_Accruals) as a dependent
variable. In Table 6, Models 1–4 and 5–6 test the incentive and opportunity channels, respectively.
Results of tests that capture the impact of durability (Models 1 and 2) show that the negative
association between brand equity and Misstatement (panel A) and Disc_Accruals (panel B) is
stronger for firms engaged in Durable products industries. For example, in panel A, the coefficient
for BE in the durable subsample (Model 1) is -0.567, which is statistically significant at the 5%
level. For the nondurable subsample (Model 2), the coefficient is -0.208, which is not statistically
significant. A similar result is reported when using Disc_Accruals as the dependent variable in
panel B. The results of tests that capture the impact of CEOs' career concern (Models 3 and 4)
show that the negative association between brand equity and Misstatement (panel A) and
Disc_Accruals (panel B) is stronger for firms which CEOs have greater career concerns. For
example, in panel A, the coefficient estimate of BE for firms for which CEOs have greater career
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investigate the effect of CEO tenure on the association between brand equity and earnings

concerns (Model 3) is -1.176 and is statistically significant. But for firms whose CEOs have low

when using Disc_Accruals as the dependent variable in panel B. These results support the incentive
channel. Brand equity plays a more substantial role in reducing the propensity of financial
reporting irregularities when such irregularities can hurt the firm and its executives’ reputations.
Next, we discuss the findings for the opportunity channel. We find that (Table 6, Models 5 and
6) the negative association between brand equity and Misstatement (panel A) and Disc_Accruals
(panel B) is stronger for firms with a higher degree of board independence. For example, in panel
A, the coefficient estimate of BE for firms with a high level of board independence (Model 5) is 1.580 and is statistically significant at the 1% level, while it is -0.630 and not statistically
significant for firms with a low level of board independence (Model 6). We obtain similar results
when using Disc_Accruals as a dependent variable (panel B). Overall, these results support our
conjecture that brand equity reduces both incentives and opportunities for earnings management. 21
4. Robustness Checks
One of our main arguments is that high-brand-equity firms avoid financial reporting
irregularities because of the higher costs these companies may incur as a result of these
irregularities (Karpoff, Lee, and Martin 2008; Raman and Shahrur 2008). In this section, we further
investigate this relation using a difference-in-differences test of the change in profitability
following the restatement announcement for a treatment sample of High_BE firms to verify that
higher reputational costs are indeed driving lower irregularities for high-brand-equity firms.
In Table 7, Model 1, we use ROA, which captures the decline in customers' demand and possible
changes in margins following restatement announcements, to measure profitability. To account for

Our untabulated results show that the difference in coefficient estimates for BE between Models 1–4
and 5–6 are statistically significant.
21

25

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/rcfs/advance-article/doi/10.1093/rcfs/cfaa018/5903745 by The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley user on 14 September 2020

career concerns (Model 4), it is 0.476 and is statistically insignificant. A similar result is reported

potential stock buybacks as a reputation-rebuilding mechanism following restatements (which

items (EPS_X) as a dependent variable in Model 2. Further, to address the possible impact of
nonoperations factors on profitability, we use earnings per share from operations (EPS_Op) as a
dependent variable in Model 3. Our DID variable is High_BE * Post.
Coefficient estimates for High_BE * Post across all these models are negative and statistically
significant, indicating that, in the post-restatements period, high-brand-equity firms experience a
greater decline in profitability than low-brand-equity firms, lending support to our excessive-costof-restatement hypothesis. This excessive cost can include erosion in a firm's ability to charge
higher prices for its products, changes in trading terms with customers, termination of customer
relationships, and reputation-rebuilding activities (Karpoff, Lee, and Martin 2008; Raman and
Shahrur 2008; Chakravarthy, deHaan, and Rajgopal 2014).
Our results so far support a causal relation at which high BE ex ante reduces a firm's propensity
to engage in financial reporting irregularities. However, an alternative explanation to our causality
explanation of our results is that the preexistence of cautious accounting policies in firms with high
BE is due to an omitted variable(s) not related to a firm's specific investment in brand equity. To
test this alternative explanation and to further establish the causality between BE and earnings
restatements, we examine the dynamic effects of BE on various measures of earnings restatements
(Simintzi, Vig and Volpin 2014; Klasa et al. 2018). Specifically, we add to our baseline model, a
lead, a contemporaneous, and several lagged values of BE. Our dynamic regression model is as
follows:
𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + (𝛽1 − 𝛽4)𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2,𝑡+1 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,

(5)

where 𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2,𝑡+1is a series of BE variables starting with a 2-year-lagged BE, BEt-2, and ending with
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might affect the number of shares outstanding), we use earnings per share before extraordinary

BE measured 1 year into the future, BEt+1. We include the same set of control variables used in our

financial reporting irregularities (hence confirming the causality hypothesis), or preexisting
cautious accounting policies in high BE firms drive the observed negative association.
Table 8 reports the results of this test. The coefficients for the lead BE variable, BEt+1, in the
models presented in Table 8 allow us to assess whether cautious accounting methods can be found
before the effect of change in BE. If the coefficient for BEt+1 is statistically significant, it could
be symptomatic of pre-BE trends in the corporate use of cautious accounting methods. Using
Disc_accruals, Disc_accruals_adj, and Misstatement_year as measures of financial reporting
irregularities, we find that the estimated coefficients for BEt+1 are not statistically significant
across all specifications. These findings provide evidence that preexisting accounting
conservatism does not cause our results. Moreover, coefficients for the BE variable are negative
and statistically significant across all specifications. These findings support our causal
interpretation of the negative association between investment in brand equity and corporate use of
accounting methods and propensity to engage in financial reporting irregularities.
Also, we conducted many untabulated robustness tests to check the sensitivity of our baseline
results to several statistical specifications and additional controls. The results of these tests are
available on request. In addition to the IV approach, we test our results with alternative measures
to rule out potential endogeneity concerns among the variables used in the baseline estimations.
Although we use the BE measure that is well-grounded in the marketing literature, the literature
also offers additional ways to capture brand equity (Johansson, Dimofte, and Mazvancheryl 2012).
By conducting additional robustness tests with these alternative measures, we address the issue of
potential error in the measurement of brand equity and also rule out remaining endogeneity
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baseline model. Using this specification, we can observe whether high BE leads to reducing

concerns about the advertisement based measures. But first, we employ a more sustainable version

while our primary measure of brand equity uses a depreciation rate of 50%, the more sustainable
alternative measure, BE20, assumes a 20% depreciation rate. Second, we employ the financialbased measure of brand equity of Simon and Sullivan (1993) that is not based only on advertising
expenses alone. Like our primary measure of BE, this approach allows us to measure brand equity
at the company level rather than the brand level. Hence, we are not restricted to firms that have
only one brand. However, Simon and Sullivan's (1993) measure employs a more comprehensive
approach to estimate brand equity by including patents, Research and Development (R&D), and
market share, among other variables. Like our baseline results, when measuring earnings
management by Misstatement and Disc_accruals, these alternative measures of brand equity are
negative and statistically significant. These results support our main argument that firms with high
brand equity are less likely to engage in aggressive earnings management.
Further, to address the possible misspecification in the measurement of our dependent
variables—Misstatement, and Disc_accruals—we use several alternative measures of earnings
management. Specifically, as an alternative measure of the likelihood of engaging in earnings
restatements, we use Restater, which is a firm-level dummy variable that equals one if a firm ever
had a restatement announcement during the sample period. The prior literature on financial
reporting irregularities differentiates between the effect of severe and minor misstatements or
earnings management (Teoh, Welch, and Wang 1998a, 1998b; Allen, Larson, and Sloan 2013;
Owers, Lin, and Rogers 2002). Restatement events that are accompanied by SEC investigations
have always been classified as irregularities instead of minor errors and are more likely to involve
managerial misbehavior (Hennes, Leone, and Miller 2008). Because of their higher value-
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of our primary measure of brand equity that uses a lower brand depreciation rate. Specifically,

destroying impact and their stronger signal of managerial misbehavior, SEC-investigation-

customer relationships (Raman and Shahrur 2008) and to impose higher opportunity costs on
companies. Consequently, we expect firms with higher brand equity to avoid severe financial
reporting manipulation that has the potential to invite SEC investigation. We identify such
incidents using the variable SEC_Inv, which is a firm-year dummy variable that equals one if a
firm has a misstatement that involves an SEC investigation in a given year.
Further, we estimate two alternative measures of discretionary accruals. Our first alternative
measure of discretionary accruals, DA_PG, addresses the concerns of Collins, Pungaliya, and Vijh
(2017) that Jones’ (1991) models of discretionary accruals are misspecified because they fail to
account for performance and growth. This issue is particularly important in our context because
high-brand-equity firms (firms with established brands) might be characterized by low growth,
and consequently, low growth-related discretionary accruals. Our second alternative measure of
discretionary accruals, DA_adv, provides a measure of discretionary accruals free of the
accounting treatment of a firm's advertising expenses. This measure should also help address the
concerns of simultaneous causality between BE and our baseline measure of discretionary accruals.
We find that BE is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Increases in BE reduce
the likelihood that a firm would announce an earnings restatement at least once in our sample period.
Specifically, given that the standard deviation for BE is 0.142, a one standard deviation increase
in BE is associated with a decline in the likelihood of restating earnings at least once by around
4.1%. Further, even if high-BE firms have a misstatement, they are expected to avoid a SEC
investigation, because an investigation could potentially disastrously affect relations with different
groups of stakeholders, including customers. The coefficient for BE is negative and statistically
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accompanied restatements are expected to result in a much greater negative impact on supplier-

significant at the 10% level. Within restating firms, an increase in BE reduces the likelihood that a

deviation increase in BE is associated with a decline in the likelihood of experiencing an SEC
investigation by around 11.3%. These results lend support to our conjecture that high investments
in BE are associated with a declining likelihood of engaging in financial reporting irregularities.
We also use an alternative measure of discretionary accruals, DA_PG, and DA_adv as
dependent variables. Like the models that use our baseline measure of discretionary accruals,
coefficient estimates of BE are negative and statistically significant. Performance and growth do
not seem to fully explain the negative association between brand equity and discretionary accruals
in our sample. Further, the possible mechanical association between advertising expenses and our
baseline measure of discretionary accruals does not seem to fully explain the negative association
between BE and our baseline measure of earnings management. However, consistent with the
assumptions of Collins, Pungaliya, and Vijh (2017), and with the assumption that some accruals
might be linked to advertising expenses, the coefficients for BE are much smaller when using
DA_PG and DA_adv.
We also test the robustness of our results in controlling for corporate reputation. Cao, Myers,
and Omer (2012) uncover a negative association between earnings restatement and corporate
reputation as measured by membership in Fortune's most admired companies list. Despite the
conceptual difference between reputation (which focuses on how business professionals perceive
a company) and brand equity (which focuses on the relationship with customers), one might argue
that brand equity is just a mirror image of a firm's reputation. To address this concern, we control
for Most_Admired, which is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is listed in the Fortune most
admired companies list in a given year. Further, we conduct or tests while excluding the great
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firm would engage in practices that would trigger an SEC investigation. Specifically, a one standard

recession years of 2007 and 2008 and using a pre-SOX (1990–2000) and post-SOX (2001–2018)

specifications.
5.

Concluding Remarks
Firms make highly specialized investments in brand building, the value of which is determined

by prospects of the customer-supplier relationships. Because accounting scandals may harm these
relationships and cause more reputational loss to executives, we argue that firms with high
investment in brand equity strive to avoid financial reporting irregularities. Our results show that
high-brand-equity firms are less likely to misstate their earnings and to have income-inflating
discretionary accruals. Further tests show that firms with valuable brands are less likely to
announce restatements that involve an SEC investigation.
We show that the impact of brand equity on financial irregularities flows through two channels:
incentive and opportunity. Because firms with high brand equity derive greater value from
customer-supplier relationships and provide nonpecuniary benefits for the executives that depend
on brand value, these firms are more likely to offer incentives that discourage earnings
manipulations and adopt an organization culture that limits managerial opportunism.
The negative association between brand equity on one hand and earnings misstatements and
discretionary accruals, on the other hand, is robust to the use of growth/performance adjusted
measure of discretionary accruals, advertising expenses measure of discretionary accruals, and to
the use of several alternative measures of brand equity. Our results are robust after controlling for
CEO characteristics, measures of corporate governance, and measures of CEO incentives and risktaking behavior. Lastly, our results are not sensitive to the enactment of SOX are did not change
by excluding the great recession years. We recognize that due to the influence of financial reporting
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periods. The coefficients for BE are negative and statistically significant across all these

irregularities, reverse causality between brand equity and financial reporting is possible. Because

results may also suffer from omitted variable bias. We use instrumental variable regression and
dynamic regression estimation methods to reduce the likelihood that the negative association
between brand equity and financial reporting irregularities is due to endogeneity. We conclude that
higher brand equity positively affects the reliability of corporate financial statements.
The prior literature on corporate finance has relatively underexplored the role of brand equity
and other intangible assets on agency issues. Srinivasan and Hanssens (2009) propose that future
research needs to expand our understanding of the benefits that flow from intangible assets
focusing on the channel(s) through which greater intangible value increases shareholder value. We
extend this field of research by focusing on accounting misconduct. We show that investing in
brand equity can increase firm value through cost savings due to lower agency costs and reduced
likelihood of corporate misconduct hence justifying the allocation of more resources into brandrelated investments.
Our findings also have implications for financial market participants. Accounting standards
require the recognition of advertising expenses as current-period expenses, suggesting that the
benefits of advertising expenses are short-lived. We show that building brand equity through
investing in unrecognized intangible assets provides longer-term benefits such as a lower
likelihood of financial reporting irregularities. Our findings also suggest that analysts’ forecasts
may be more accurate for high-brand-equity firms, which are less likely to restate their earnings
and engage in aggressive earnings management. Information environments without restatements
and earnings management are more transparent.

32

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/rcfs/advance-article/doi/10.1093/rcfs/cfaa018/5903745 by The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley user on 14 September 2020

managers use their discretion to build brand equity and select accounting methods, our baseline
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A. Baseline model (N = 47,216)
Misstatement
Disc_accruals
BE
ln_MVE
Leverage
MB
ROA
Neg_ROA
AR_IN
R&D
KZ_index
Segments
HHI
Foreign

Mean

SD

25th perc.

50th perc.

75th perc.

0.115
0.013
0.081
5.214
0.290
2.801
-0.161
0.294
0.299
0.056
1.061
1.953
0.243
0.649

0.318
0.439
0.142
2.637
0.512
7.553
0.959
0.455
0.212
0.123
4.815
1.536
0.184
0.477

0.000
-0.056
0.011
3.276
0.016
0.942
-0.089
0.000
0.120
0.000
-0.017
1.000
0.109
0.000

0.000
0.005
0.032
5.208
0.182
1.896
0.025
0.000
0.263
0.003
0.771
1.000
0.193
1.000

0.000
0.076
0.085
7.117
0.371
3.639
0.084
1.000
0.442
0.067
1.744
3.000
0.310
1.000

25th perc.
0.000
0.000
-0.044
-0.053

50th perc.
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

75th perc.
1.000
0.000
0.044
0.052

B. Other measures of financial reporting irregularities (N = 47,216)
Restater
SEC_inv
DA_PG
DA_adv

Mean
0.563
0.101
0.003
0.005

SD
0.496
0.302
0.290
0.274

Panel A reports descriptive statistics for our main dependent variables (Misstatement and Disc_accruals)
and baseline model control variables. Panel B describes additional measures of financial reporting
irregularities. We define all variables in the appendix and winsorize continuous variables at the 1% and 99%
levels.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics

Misstatement

Disc_accruals

BE

Size

Leverage

MB

ROA

Neg_ROA

AR_IN

R&D

KZ_index

Segments

HHI

Disc_accruals
BE
Size
Leverage
MB
ROA
Neg_ROA
AR_IN
R&D
KZ_index
Segments
HHI
Foreign

0.000
-0.012
0.083
0.009
-0.007
-0.033
0.017
-0.082
-0.010
0.014
0.052
-0.025
-0.129

-0.046
0.025
-0.066
0.008
0.094
-0.049
0.031
-0.030
-0.046
0.014
-0.012
0.012

-0.140
0.156
-0.020
-0.179
0.098
0.080
0.066
0.124
-0.085
-0.023
-0.061

-0.183
0.144
0.203
-0.357
-0.275
-0.118
-0.130
0.302
-0.071
0.100

-0.115
-0.433
0.209
-0.010
0.123
0.403
-0.031
-0.018
-0.131

0.062
-0.009
-0.055
0.007
-0.065
-0.014
-0.009
0.030

-0.357
0.072
-0.291
-0.387
0.081
0.018
0.160

-0.112
0.269
0.181
-0.123
-0.037
-0.124

-0.040
0.025
-0.084
0.204
0.119

0.087
-0.115
-0.054
0.004

-0.035
-0.010
-0.073

0.027
0.041

0.041

We report Pearson correlation coefficients for our main dependent variables (Misstatement and Disc_accruals) and our baseline model control
variables. We define all variables in the appendix and winsorize continuous variables at the 1% and 99% levels.
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Table 2
Pearson correlation coefficients

Misstatement

Disc_accruals

A. Misstatement and Disc_accruals for two groups of firms ranked by BE (N = 23,608)
Below-median BE
Above-median BE
Difference

0.122
0.107
0.015***
(0.000)

0.027
-0.001
0.028***
(0.000)

B. Misstatement and Disc_accruals for four groups of firms ranked by BE (N = 11,804)
BE Q1
BE Q2
BE Q3
BE Q4
Difference (Q1 – Q4)

0.139
0.105
0.104
0.110
0.028***
(0.000)

0.037
0.016
0.005
-0.009
0.046***
(0.000)

C. Misstatement and Disc_accruals for ten groups of firms ranked by BE (N = 4,722)
BE D1
BE D2
BE D3
BE D4
BE D5
BE D6
BE D7
BE D8
BE D9
BE D10
Difference (D1 – D10)

0.144
0.042
0.143
0.041
0.113
0.020
0.106
0.021
0.104
0.007
0.096
0.008
0.106
0.003
0.113
0.007
0.114
-0.003
0.105
-0.022
0.038***
0.066***
(0.000)
(0.000)
We classify firms according to whether BE is above or below median (panel A), based on quartiles (panel
B) and deciles (panel C). For each of these classifications, in turn, we present the mean for earnings
restatement (Misstatement) and discretionary accruals (Disc_accruals). Misstatement is a dummy variable
that equals one if the company misstates its financial reports in a given year. Disc_accruals is the residual
from the Jones’ (1991) model. BE is our measure of a firm’s brand equity. Differences in means are based
on t-statistics. We define all variables in the appendix and winsorize continuous variables at the 1% and 99%
levels. We report p-values in parentheses. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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Table 3
Brand equity, earnings restatement, and earnings management: A univariate analysis

Constant
BE

47,216
No

Misstatement
(2)
-2.039***
(0.000)
-0.201*
(0.070)
0.077***
(0.000)
-0.038
(0.252)
-0.007***
(0.000)
-0.064***
(0.000)
0.100***
(0.009)
-0.405***
(0.000)
-0.478***
(0.001)
0.005
(0.169)
0.059***
(0.000)
-0.158*
(0.060)
-0.601***
(0.000)
47,216
No

(3)
-6.987***
(0.000)
-0.311***
(0.009)
0.039***
(0.000)
0.008
(0.806)
-0.005**
(0.013)
-0.064***
(0.000)
0.025
(0.520)
-0.112
(0.261)
-0.532***
(0.000)
0.005
(0.114)
0.014
(0.144)
-0.161
(0.110)
-0.026
(0.472)
47,216
Yes

16,801

16,444

15,001

(1)
-2.025***
(0.000)
-0.261**
(0.015)

ln_MVE
Leverage
MB
ROA
Neg_ROA
AR_IN
R&D
KZ_index
Segments
HHI
Foreign
No. of observations
Year and industry FE
Adjusted R2 (%)
- log likelihood

(4)
0.024***
(0.000)
-0.135***
(0.000)

47,216
No
0.7

Disc_accruals
(5)
0.037***
(0.000)
-0.079***
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.214)
-0.025***
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.981)
0.033***
(0.000)
-0.009*
(0.073)
0.048***
(0.000)
0.004
(0.832)
-0.000
(0.435)
0.003**
(0.048)
-0.057***
(0.000)
-0.003
(0.502)
47,216
No
1.1

(6)
-0.036
(0.231)
-0.140**
(0.032)
-0.007*
(0.059)
-0.053***
(0.008)
0.000
(0.492)
0.023
(0.102)
-0.029***
(0.000)
0.244***
(0.000)
-0.135*
(0.066)
-0.001
(0.689)
0.004*
(0.056)
-0.023
(0.348)
0.010
(0.309)
47,216
Yes
2.6

We report results of estimates of our baseline logistic (OLS) models with Misstatement (Models 1–3) and
Disc_accruals (Models 4–6) as the dependent variables. Misstatement is a dummy variable that equals one
if the company misstates its financial reports in a given year. Disc_accruals is the residual from the Jones’
(1991) model. BE is our measure of a firm's brand equity. We define all variables in the appendix and
winsorize continuous variables at 1% and 99% levels. We use robust standard errors and cluster at the firm
level. We report p-values in parentheses. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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Table 4
Brand equity, earnings restatement, and earnings management: A regression analysis

.

Constant

First-stage
BE
(1)
0.045***
(0.000)

Second-stage
Misstatement
(2)

Instrumented_BE
ln_firm_age
ln_MVE
Leverage
MB
ROA
Neg_ROA
AR_IN
R&D
KZ_index
Segments
HHI
Foreign
No. of observations
Robust SE
Year and industry FE
Adjusted R2 (%)
Wald chi2
First-stage F-stat.

0.008***
(0.000)
-0.004***
(0.000)
0.026***
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.062)
-0.014***
(0.000)
0.003
(0.159)
0.046***
(0.000)
0.065***
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.177)
0.003
(0.707)
-0.002
(0.419)
47,216
Yes
Yes
15.6

-1.255**
(0.020)

Second-stage
Disc_accruals
(3)
0.032
(0.185)
-1.149**
(0.026)

0.001
(0.629)
0.030*
(0.067)
-0.000
(0.226)
-0.027***
(0.004)
0.016**
(0.012)
0.012
(0.703)
0.040
(0.385)
0.002**
(0.022)
0.005**
(0.028)
-0.008
(0.658)
-0.061***
(0.000)
47,216
Yes
Yes

-0.006**
(0.047)
0.002
(0.913)
0.000
(0.914)
0.018
(0.180)
-0.007
(0.318)
0.137***
(0.000)
0.030
(0.609)
0.001
(0.405)
0.001
(0.588)
-0.005
(0.736)
-0.006
(0.298)
47,216
Yes
Yes

503

280

17.89

We report results of estimates of 2SLS instrumental variable (IV) models that use ln_firm_age as an
instrument. Columns 1 and 2 show coefficient estimates of the first- and second-stage models for which
Misstatement is the dependent variable in the second stage. Columns 1 and 3 show coefficient estimates of
the first- and second-stage models for which Disc_accruals is the dependent variable in the second stage, We
define all variables in the appendix and winsorize continuous variables at 1% and 99% levels. We report pvalues in parentheses. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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Table 5
Brand equity and earnings restatement and management: IV analysis

Constant
BE
No. of observations
Controls
Year and industry
FE
- log likelihood

Constant
BE
No. of observations
Controls
Year and industry
FE
Adjusted R2 (%)

Durable = 1
(1)
-6.716***
(0.000)
-0.567**
(0.037)
16,808
Yes
Yes
4,707

Durable = 1
(1)
-0.057*
(0.059)
-0.147**
(0.012)
16,808
Yes
Yes
4.3

A. Brand equity and earnings misstatements (Misstatement)
Incentive channel
Durable = 0
Career_conc. = 1 Career_conc. = 0
(2)
(3)
(4)
-2.243***
-0.475
1.001
(0.000)
(0.698)
(0.200)
-0.208
-1.176**
-0.476
(0.116)
(0.014)
(0.302)
28,349
7,038
7,038
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
10,244
2,720
2,360
B. Brand equity and earnings management (Disc_accruals)
Incentive channel
Durable = 0
Career_conc. = 1 Career_conc.= 0
(2)
(3)
(4)
-0.051**
-0.003
-0.066*
(0.010)
(0.941)
(0.074)
-0.073**
-0.094***
0.009
(0.021)
(0.008)
(0.853)
28,349
7,038
7,038
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
3.7

6.6

4.4

Opportunity channel
BOD_indep. = 1
BOD_indep. = 0
(5)
(6)
-1.694**
-3.775***
(0.027)
(0.002)
-1.580***
-0.630
(0.000)
(0.181)
7,669
6,374
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,073

2,258

Opportunity channel
BOD_indep. = 1
BOD_indep. = 0
(5)
(6)
-0.054*
0.010
(0.078)
(0.829)
-0.046*
-0.046
(0.100)
(0.370)
7,669
6,374
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
6.8

3.5

This table reports the results of regression models using several subsamples. The dependent variable in panel A is Misstatement, and panel B is
Disc_accruals. Durable is a dummy variable that equals one for firms in durable products industries. Career_Conc. is a dummy variable that equals
one if a CEO has a below-median tenure. BOD_indep. is a dummy variable that equals one if the percentage of outside directors in a firm's BOD
is above median. We define all variables in the appendix and winsorize continuous variables at the 1% and 99% levels. We use robust standard
errors and cluster at the firm level. We report p-values in parentheses. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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Table 6
Brand equity and financial reporting irregularities: Incentive and/or opportunity
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Constant
High_BE * Post
High_BE
Post
ln_MVE
Leverage
MB
AR_IN
R&D
KZ_index
Segments
HHI
Foreign
No. of observations
Year and industry FE
Adjusted R2 (%)

ROA
(1)
-0.297**
(0.027)
-0.081*
(0.077)
-0.048
(0.171)
0.072**
(0.014)
0.060***
(0.000)
-0.644***
(0.000)
0.004
(0.152)
0.502***
(0.000)
-1.582***
(0.000)
-0.070***
(0.000)
0.021***
(0.000)
-0.263***
(0.002)
0.177***
(0.000)
7,613
Yes
40.5

EPS_X
(2)
0.792**
(0.011)
-0.170**
(0.038)
0.105*
(0.082)
0.024
(0.675)
0.280***
(0.000)
0.075**
(0.014)
0.004**
(0.043)
0.934***
(0.000)
-0.834***
(0.000)
-0.021***
(0.000)
0.006
(0.706)
0.307**
(0.015)
-0.254***
(0.000)
7,613
Yes
17.7

EPS_op
(3)
0.444**
(0.040)
-0.141**
(0.027)
0.112**
(0.018)
0.023
(0.614)
0.301***
(0.000)
0.119***
(0.000)
0.000
(0.894)
0.949***
(0.000)
-0.850***
(0.000)
-0.014***
(0.000)
0.034***
(0.005)
0.304***
(0.003)
-0.135***
(0.000)
7,613
Yes
27.2

This table reports results of difference-in-differences (DID) tests of the impact of restatement
announcements on profitability. High_BE equals one if a firm has above-median BE, and 0 otherwise. Post
equals one for the post-restatement announcement period. High_BE * Post, which is our RHS DID variable
of interest, is the interaction term of High_BE and Post. The dependent variables in Models 1, 2, and 3 are
ROA, EPS_X, and EPS_Op, respectively. To eliminate the effect of confounding events, we restrict our test
to the 3 years before and after the restatement announcement year. We define all variables in the appendix
and winsorize continuous variables at the 1% and 99% levels. We use robust standard errors and cluster at
the firm level. We report p-values in parentheses. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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Table 7
Profitability following restatement announcements: A DID test

Constant
BEt+1
BE
BEt-1
BEt-2
ln_MVE
Leverage
MB
ROA
Neg_ROA
AR_IN
R&D
KZ_index
Segments
HHI
Foreign
No. of observations
Year and industry FE
Adjusted R2 (%)
- log likelihood

Misstatement
(1)
(2)
-6.476***
-6.472***
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.001
0.000
(0.960)
(0.988)
-0.340**
-0.246*
(0.027)
(0.071)
-0.001
0.005
(0.979)
(0.895)
-0.096
(0.323)
0.021**
0.020**
(0.022)
(0.023)
0.010
0.010
(0.814)
(0.813)
-0.006**
-0.006**
(0.012)
(0.013)
-0.046**
-0.048**
(0.042)
(0.035)
0.041
0.039
(0.380)
(0.398)
-0.142
-0.148
(0.227)
(0.209)
-0.407**
-0.417**
(0.030)
(0.026)
0.012***
0.012***
(0.003)
(0.003)
0.018*
0.018*
(0.093)
(0.096)
-0.155
-0.156
(0.181)
(0.177)
-0.034
-0.034
(0.419)
(0.416)
33,901
33,901
Yes
Yes
11,264

Disc_accruals
(3)
(4)
-0.087***
-0.085**
(0.009)
(0.011)
0.025
0.025
(0.142)
(0.141)
-0.204**
-0.195**
(0.032)
(0.042)
0.012
0.012
(0.818)
(0.808)
-0.030
(0.198)
-0.002
-0.002
(0.546)
(0.556)
-0.053**
-0.053**
(0.046)
(0.045)
0.000
0.000
(0.422)
(0.406)
0.038**
0.038**
(0.047)
(0.050)
-0.019**
-0.019**
(0.037)
(0.034)
0.274***
0.274***
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.022
0.019
(0.838)
(0.865)
-0.002
-0.002
(0.356)
(0.369)
0.004
0.003
(0.129)
(0.137)
-0.017
-0.017
(0.488)
(0.486)
0.016
0.016
(0.126)
(0.125)
33,901
33,901
Yes
Yes
0.030
0.030

11,264

We report the results of estimates of dynamic regression models of the determinants of financial reporting
irregularities. The dependent variable is Misstatement in Models 1 and 2 and Disc_accruals in Models 3
and 4. We define all variables in the appendix and winsorize continuous variables at the 1% and 99% levels.
We use robust standard errors and cluster at the firm level. We report p-values in parentheses. **p < .1; **p
< .05; ***p < .01.
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Table 8
Brand equity and financial reporting irregularities: Dynamic analysis

Appendix

Variable
Definition
Brand equity variables
BE
Brand equity scaled by TA. Brand equity is calculated using the perpetual
inventory method (1 - δ)Bt-1 + At
BE20
Sustainable brand equity calculated using a 20% depreciation rate instead of a
50% one
Measure of brand equity following the Simon and Sullivan (1993) definition
BESS
Earnings management and earnings restatement variables
Misstatement
A firm-year-level dummy variable that equals one if the company misstates its
financial reports in a given year
Restater
A firm-level dummy variable that equals one if the firm ever announces a
restatement during the sample period
SEC_Inv
A firm-year-level dummy variable that equals one if the firm has a misstatement
that involves SEC investigation during the year
Disc_Acccruals
The residual from Jones’ (1991) model modified following Dechow, Sloan, and
Sweeney (1995). Specifically, for each calendar year and two-digit SIC code, we
estimate the following equation:
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1 1⁄𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 (∆ 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,
where TACR is total accruals calculated as TACR = ΔCA - ΔCL - ΔCASH ΔSTD – DEP, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is a random error term. We control for the lagged value of
TACR. Further, following the accounting literature, all variables are scaled by total
assets at the beginning of the year. Nondiscretionary accruals are measured as
the fitted value of Equation (3). Finally, Disc_Accruals is
measured as the model's residual, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
DA_PG

DA_Adv

Control variables
ln_MVE
Leverage
MB

Discretionary accruals adjusted for growth and performance. For each firm-year,
we first estimate discretionary accruals as the residual from the modified Jones’
(1991) model. Then, within each year and industry (two-digit SIC code), we
construct five quintile ranks based on growth (sales growth) and operating
performance (ROA), resulting in 25 unique portfolios within each year/industry.
Adjusted_DA is the firm-year discretionary accruals, Disc_Accruals minus the
median discretionary accruals of the performance/growth-matched portfolio for
the same year and industry
Discretionary accruals that eliminate the effect of the accounting treatment of
advertising expenses. In this measure, discretionary accruals are defined as the
residual from the following model:
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1 1⁄𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 (∆ 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 Advertising_exp𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
The natural logarithm of a firm's total equity
Firm's total debt divided by total assets
The ratio of market value to book value of total equity

45

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/rcfs/advance-article/doi/10.1093/rcfs/cfaa018/5903745 by The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley user on 14 September 2020

Table A1. Variable definitions

ROA

Foreign

Market shares are computed based on firms' sales
A dummy variable that equals one if a firm has foreign sales

Neg_ROA
R&D
KZ-index
Segments
ln_firm_age

Durable

i=1

Career_Concern

A dummy variable that equals one for firms involved in the construction and/or
manufacturing of durable products, identified as firms with SIC codes 150–179,
245, 250–259, 283, 301, and 324–399
A dummy variable that equals one when a CEO has a below-median tenure

BOD_Independence

The percentage of independent members on the board of directors

CA

Current assets

CL

Current liabilities

Cash

Cash holdings

STD

Short-term debt

TA

Total sssets

Sale

Total sales

Rec

Trade receivables

PPEN
DID test variables
EPS_X
EPS_Op
High_BE

Net property, plant, and equipment

Post
High_BE * Post

Earnings per share before extraordinary items
Earnings per share from operations
A dummy variable that equals one if a firm has above-median BE in a given
year
A dummy variable that equals one for the 3 years following earnings
restatement announcement year
The interaction term of High_BE and Post

46

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/rcfs/advance-article/doi/10.1093/rcfs/cfaa018/5903745 by The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley user on 14 September 2020

HHI

Returns on assets defined as income before extraordinary items divided by total
assets at the beginning of the year
A dummy variable that equals one if a firm has 2 consecutive years with
negative ROA (current and previous year)
The ratio of research and development expenses to a firm's total assets
The index that measures a firm's dependency on external financing (Kaplan and
Zingales 1997)
Number of a firm's business segments
The natural logarithm of the age of a firm calculated using the first year a firm
has data on Compustat
∑N sales2, where salesijt is the market share of firm i industry j in year t

